AI agent skill · by @mvschwarz

Applying A Permission Policy

Use before launching a team during agent-guided setup, or when a user asks to configure OpenRig command permissions, reduce repeated native approval prompts, or apply a selected rig/seat permission policy.

Archived 2026-10-23 · Source updated 2026-10-05 · License: Apache-2.0. Check the original repository for the latest version.

SKILL.md instructions

# Applying a permission policy

Configure the user's chosen permissions in the harness that runs the agent.
OpenRig operating posture, native command rules, sandbox access and launch flags
are separate controls. A command rule grants execution capability, not authority
to invent tasks, publish work or change another host.

## Ask once before team launch

Reuse an existing explicit choice for these harnesses and this scope from the
user's onboarding context; do not ask again. Existing rules are configuration,
not evidence of consent to expand their scope. Preserve them without expansion.
If the choice is unknown, briefly explain:

> This allows the whole `rig` command family, including starting/stopping agents,
> changing OpenRig configuration and launching processes. It is not global YOLO
> or permission to invent work. The scope is your personal settings for this
> project unless you explicitly choose your user-wide sessions instead.
>
> Allow your agents to run OpenRig commands without repeated permission prompts?
> **Yes — recommended** / **No — keep prompts**

- **Yes:** require an actual affirmative answer, then apply the procedure below
  at that scope for the selected harnesses. Never substitute user-wide rules
  when project rules are unsupported. Native restrictions still apply.
- **No:** leave permission settings unchanged and continue with existing prompts.
- **No answer:** make no settings change, infer no consent and continue with
  existing prompts. Do not keep asking during this setup.

Remember an explicit Yes or No in the existing onboarding/project context the
agent already reads: choice, harnesses and scope. For Yes, record the exact files
and entries added, any pre-existing equivalents, and the loading/verification
result. Do not add a preference service or native configuration key. No answer
is not a remembered No. Offer broader permissive operation only as a separate
explicit opt-in; the setup question does not select a builtin policy or mode.

## Choose the intended scope

Outside the setup question above, use an existing explicit choice; otherwise
explain these options and ask which the user wants. Do not reopen the menu after
an answered setup question or ask again for routine steps already authorized.

| Choice | What the agent configures |
| --- | --- |
| Keep prompts | Preserve current native settings and handle requests when they arise. |
| Remember selected commands | Add native allow rules for the chosen family or narrower verbs, leaving other rules and sandbox settings intact. |
| Broader permissive operation | Explain filesystem/network exposure and configure only the explicitly selected native mode and compatible launch settings. |

**Allowing the whole `rig` family covers all its verbs**, including lifecycle,
topology/config changes and commands that can launch other processes. It is not
a read-only grant. Offer narrower prefixes such as `rig ps` or `rig queue list`
when that better fits the request. Do not widen a choice to arbitrary shell
execution, an entire interpreter or a generic shell wrapper.

## Apply the choice for the user

1. Identify the target seat, executable/version, launch settings and config roots:
   `HOME`, `CODEX_HOME` or `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` as applicable. They may differ between
   operator, daemon and seat. Resolve the intended user's/project's files before
   writing; do not repair another home to make the paths agree.
2. Read relevant existing permission rules and managed restrictions. Select the
   intended scope: one project or the user's sessions. Consult installed native
   help and official references below when formats differ.
3. Prepare a concrete diff. Preserve deny/ask rules, approval/sandbox posture,
   hooks, auth, MCP, model settings and unrelated values. An allow must not erase
   a stricter rule or managed requirement. Report a real conflict instead of
   silently bypassing it.
   Check both bare and actual absolute command spellings: a restriction on one
   may not match the other. If a new allowance would evade a stricter restriction,
   leave that addition unapplied and report the conflict; do not switch spellings
   to bypass it.
4. Back up touched files and merge only authorized additions, avoiding duplicates.
   Recognize equivalent existing entries (including Claude's legacy `Bash(rig:*)`);
   leave their markers untouched. Reapplying the same choice must be a no-op when
   the required entries already exist, including no timestamp-only rewrite.
   The agent performs these edits; hand-editing is an option, not a required user
   chore. Apply the selected scope without another conversational permission round.
   Native enforcement still applies.
5. Read back the diff and validate the format. Confirm how that version loads
   changes. If it requires a new session, preserve work and use its supported
   resume path within the user's authority; a file write does not prove that an
   existing conversation loaded it.
6. Verify an ordinary matching operation twice in the target conversation and
   check that an unrelated command gained no matching rule. Use harmless reads,
   not destructive probes. Report effective settings and remaining prompts.
   A parser match alone does not establish native behavior.

Give the user this short undo: **“Undo the OpenRig command allowances added by
this setup; keep my other rules.”** The agent removes only the recorded entries
from their exact files, preserving pre-existing rules and subsequent edits.
For Codex remove those `prefix_rule` entries; for Claude remove those
`permissions.allow` entries. Delete a newly created rules file only if it still
contains solely this setup's additions. Never restore the entire backup over
later changes. Record the changed choice in the same context and verify native
reloading/revocation; other pre-existing allowances may still permit `rig`.
Builtin policy specs remain read-only; customize in user space.

## Codex command rules

Codex command rules can allow matching commands outside the sandbox without
another prompt. They leave other sandbox/network settings unchanged.
Check `codex --version` and `codex execpolicy check --help`.
See the [official rules reference](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/rules).

Choose the destination **before writing**, according to the user's scope:

- **This project only:** verify the installed version supports project rules and
  derive this session's actual project/worktree config root and trust state.
  Current docs describe `<repo>/.codex/rules/` in a trusted project config layer.
  Use that layer only after confirming it is supported, active and trusted for
  the intended project. If any of those facts is unsupported or unverified,
  report the limitation and leave user-layer rules unchanged; do not silently
  mark a project trusted or substitute a user-wide allowance.
- **Explicitly user-wide:** use `rules/` under the target user's actual
  `CODEX_HOME` (normally `~/.codex/rules`). This can affect other projects using
  that home. The TUI's remember-allow action also writes a user-layer rule;
  do not use it to implement a project-only request.

Merge the chosen rule into a `.rules` file in the selected layer. The prefix
itself has no project restriction; even a project-layer rule does not constrain
which targets an allowed `rig` command can affect:

```python
prefix_rule(pattern = ["rig"], decision = "allow")
```

For narrower access use `["rig", "ps"]` or `["rig", "queue", "list"]`, adjusting
examples. For absolute-path invocations, derive the target seat's actual `rig`
executable and add that exact path as a separate prefix; a bare rule does not
match it. Never copy another machine's path.

```sh
codex execpolicy check --pretty --rules /absolute/path/to/openrig.rules -- rig ps --json
codex execpolicy check --pretty --rules /absolute/path/to/openrig.rules -- printf permission-check
```

Inspect matches, not only exit status; repeat `--rules` for other effective
files. A matching `prompt` or `forbidden` overrides allow. The official procedure
loads `.rules` at session startup; a file edit alone does not reload this turn.
Preserve the conversation and use an authorized supported resume when needed,
then verify loading in the target conversation. For project-only scope,
confirm the layer is active there and absent from an unrelated project's active
layers. An evaluator given an explicit `--rules` file proves matching, not that
scope or automatic loading. Existing user-wide rules may already permit the
same command: preserve and disclose them, attribute matches, and do not claim
project isolation or remove those rules without a separate authorized choice.

The standalone evaluator checks supplied argv; native shell parsing can split
ordinary commands/chains first. A raw `zsh -lc` non-match does not prove that
native `rig && rig` fails. Verify both surfaces without broadening the rule to
`bash`, `sh`, `node` or generic wrappers.

## Claude Code command rules

Check `claude --version` and [official permission syntax](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions).
Merge the chosen entry into existing `permissions.allow`; this fragment is not
a replacement settings file:

```json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": ["Bash(rig *)"]
  }
}
```

Current syntax uses ` *` for a command family; `Bash(rig:*)` is also supported.
Narrower examples are `Bash(rig ps *)` and `Bash(rig queue list *)`.
Preserve `deny`/`ask` entries and `defaultMode`; do not add `Bash(*)` or switch
to bypass to resolve a mismatch. Inspect native `/permissions` and verify the
actual command spelling. A bare rule does not cover every absolute invocation:
derive the actual executable and, after the stricter-rule check above, add its
exact `Bash(/actual/path/to/rig *)` spelling if needed. Do not use a path wildcard.

Choose scope using the [settings reference](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/settings):
`.claude/settings.local.json` for personal project settings,
`.claude/settings.json` for deliberately shared project settings, or
`settings.json` under the target's `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` (normally `~/.claude`).
Confirm the effective project root, especially for worktrees. Keep personal
settings out of commits. Managed restrictions and sandbox/network controls
still apply; a Bash allow is not a general network policy.
Current Claude settings documentation describes live reload of permission
edits. Confirm the rule's source in `/permissions` and repeated harmless calls
in the target conversation; do not claim prompt behavior from JSON validity.

## Existing policies and broader modes

For a named policy, read its actual `permission_policy` spec and `source` marker.
Translate intended actions using supported native controls; do not collapse all
Codex policies to a single posture or claim shell patterns perfectly express
semantic actions such as force-push. Preserve stricter rules. If exact translation
is unavailable, explain the remaining choice instead of selecting broader access.

For explicitly chosen broader operation, inspect
`rig policy current --spec <user-owned-rig.yaml>` and the compatible getting-started guide's **Opt-in permissive
operation** section. OpenRig's Codex `builtin:yolo` supplies
`-s danger-full-access -a never` and replaces a named `codex_config_profile`
argument. The legacy environment-only YOLO path selects only the sandbox.
Claude's corresponding launch flag is
`--dangerously-skip-permissions`. Neither a resource `profile: default` nor OpenRig
operating posture is a native permission policy. Do not change shipped defaults
or assume editing a launch spec changes an existing seat.

A headless seat may wait at a native prompt. Arrange an answer path or choose
suitable command rules; unattended work is not implicit consent to bypass.
For Pi, the previously supported `--approve`/`--no-approve` surface concerns
project-resource trust, not shell permissions; verify its installed capabilities
instead of treating those flags as a command allowlist.